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Protecting the Greater Good: A Critique of the Public Duty
Doctrine as Applied in Murray v. County of Person*
INTRODUCTION
Governments provide many services, such as fire departments
and police departments, and have numerous regulatory schemes in
order to protect the public from various risks. In North Carolina, the
General Assembly has adopted regulatory schemes to help ensure the
safety of rides at amusement parks,1 of septic tanks,2 of workplaces,3
and of various other aspects of daily life.4
The State frequently relies on the public duty doctrine when
individuals attempt to hold the State liable for failing to fulfill its
regulatory duties.5 The public duty doctrine shields a government
* © 2010 Alexander B. Punger.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-111.1 to 95-111.18 (2007 & Supp. 2008) (protecting the
public from unsafe amusement park rides and preventing injuries is in the best interest of
the people of North Carolina).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-333 to 130A-343 (2007 & Supp. 2008) (establishing
regulations for wastewater treatment systems to protect the public health).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-126 to 95-155 (2007 & Supp. 2008) (adopting a regulatory
scheme to ensure safe workplaces). The General Assembly created the Division of
Standards and Inspections of the Department of Labor in 1931. Act of Apr. 22, 1931, ch.
312, § 12,1931 N.C. Pub. Laws 383, 387-89 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-
11 (2007)). This division was charged with ensuring that all laws, rules, and regulations for
the safety of labor were carried out. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-11 (2007). The Division of
Standards and Inspections was probably ineffective at ensuring the safety of labor since
the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
North Carolina in 1973 for the purpose of promoting safety in the workplace.
Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina, ch. 295, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws
305,305-06 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-126).
4. See, e.g., Animal Welfare Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19A-20 to 19A-41 (2007 &
Supp. 2008); Motor Vehicle Act of 1937, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-39 to 20-183 (2007 &
Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25C-14 (2007) (providing disclosure requirements for the
sale of prints of artwork); North Carolina Drinking Water Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-
311 to 130A-329 (2007 & Supp. 2008).
5. See, e.g., Wood v. Guilford County, 355 N.C. 161, 163, 558 S.E.2d 490, 493 (2002)
(claiming that Guilford County negligently provided security in its courthouses); Hunt ex
reL Hasty v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 194-95, 499 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1998)
(contending that the State is liable for injuries because it had a duty under the Amusement
Device Safety Act to inspect go-kart seatbelts); Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C.
473, 483, 495 S.E.2d 711, 717 (1998) (alleging the N.C. Department of Labor was negligent
for failing to inspect a factory pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-4); Watts v. N.C. Dep't of
Env't & Natural Res., 182 N.C. App. 178, 180-82, 641 S.E.2d 811, 815-16 (2007) (claiming
the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("NCDENR")
was negligent in performing a soil test required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-336), affd in
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entity from liability to an individual when the government entity acts
for the benefit of the public by performing a public duty.6 Critics of
the doctrine's application in North Carolina frequently build their
arguments around specific examples of the government failing to
prevent an injury despite an existing regulatory scheme.7
Although the examples the critics cite are tragic and doubtlessly
cause incredible amounts of suffering for the victims, it is misleading
to use these individual instances to evaluate the public duty doctrine.
The public duty doctrine exists to promote the welfare of the public,
not the welfare of a specific individual. By focusing on the individual
failings of the doctrine, critics ignore the broader benefits provided by
it. Because the doctrine only applies to duties that protect the public
at large, critics should consider the broader public implications of the
doctrine rather than its effects on individuals. Regulatory systems can
be criticized for increasing tax burdens or enlarging government.8 But
when analyzed at a public level, regulatory systems in North Carolina
have minimized risks to which the public is exposed.9
part as modified per curiam by 362 N.C. 497, 666 S.E.2d 752 (2008). The public duty
doctrine remains a constant source of commentary, specifically in North Carolina. See
Anita Brown-Graham, Local Governments and the Public Duty Doctrine after Wood v.
Guilford County, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2291,2293 (2003) (noting problems with the inconsistent
application of the doctrine); G. Braxton Price, Comment, "Inevitable Inequities:" The
Public Duty Doctrine and Sovereign Immunity in North Carolina, 28 CAMPBELL L. REV.
271, 271-73 (2006) (critiquing the inconsistent application of the public duty doctrine and
arguing for its abrogation); Frank Swindell, Note, Municipal Liability for Negligent
Inspections in Sinning v. Clark-A "Hollow" Victory for the Public Duty Doctrine, 18
CAMPBELL L. REV. 241, 241-43 (1996) (criticizing the public duty doctrine as applied to
building inspections).
6. See Stone, 347 N.C. at 482, 495 S.E.2d at 716 ("Because the governmental entity
owes no particular duty to any individual claimant, it cannot be held liable for negligence
for a failure to carry out its statutory duties." (citing Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363,
370, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1991))).
7. See Brown-Graham, supra note 5, at 2292-93 (using an attack against Shelley
Wood that took place in Guilford County Courthouse to frame her criticisms); Price,
supra note 5, at 271-72 (using an automobile crash that took the lives of two children and
a fire at a food processing plant that took the lives of twenty-five employees to base his
critiques); Swindell, supra note 5, at 241-42 (describing one couple's experience with a
housing inspector to criticize the doctrine).
8. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control
in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 1018 (2006) (commenting that regulations can increase
tax burdens for startup companies); Molly Zohn, Filling the Void: International Legal
Structures and Political Risk in Investment, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 230, 233 (2007)
(commenting that regulations can increase tax burdens in relation to investments).
9. One can get a sense of the added safety these regulations and agencies provide by
examining the scope of inspections the agencies conduct. The NCDENR was monitoring
2,763 large wastewater systems as of January 1, 2010. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res.,
On-Site Water Protection Section: Large Wastewater Systems, http://www.deh.enr.state
.nc.us/oswwnew/newl/largewwsys.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2010) (clicking on "System
2010]
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The public duty doctrine and the corresponding protection from
liability it affords government actors play an important role in
allowing North Carolina governmental entities to create regulations
for the public's benefit. Because the doctrine shields a government
entity from liability when it acts for the benefit of the public rather
than for the benefit of an individual, the General Assembly can freely
adopt regulations without the fear of tort liability for failing to
enforce the regulations or for enforcing them negligently.1" This
protection encourages government entities to adopt safety
regulations, and according to the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
" '[i]t is better to have such laws, even haphazardly enforced, than not
to have them at all.' "11
The recent North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in Murray
v. County of Person2 threatens the effectiveness of the public duty
doctrine and thereby discourages the State from enacting safety
regulations. The dispute in Murray involved the installation of an
"innovative wastewater treatment system" on the plaintiff's
property. 3 One defendant was an Environmental Health Specialist
for the Person County Health Department ("PCHD") who issued an
installation permit in 2002 and repair permits after the system failed
in 2004.1' The plaintiff sued the Environmental Health Specialist and
two other members of the PCHD, who also inspected Murray's
wastewater treatment system, in their individual and official
capacities for negligently issuing the permits. 5 No party appealed the
trial court's dismissal of the official capacity claims, so the court of
appeals heard only the individual capacity claims. 6
Information" under the heading "Large Systems Database" will link to a spreadsheet that
provides information on large wastewater systems). The North Carolina Department of
Labor documented thousands of violations of safety regulations. Div. of Occupational
Safety & Health, N.C. Dep't of Labor, Top 25 Most Frequently Cited "Serious"
Construction Standards, http://www.nclabor.com/dolstatistics/stats.htm (last visited Jan.
2, 2010).
10. The need to prevent the State from exposing itself to the risk of crippling liability
has been used to justify the doctrine. See Stone, 347 N.C. at 481, 495 S.E.2d at 716 (citing
Grogan v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky. 1979)); Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C.
363, 370-71, 410 S.E.2d. 897, 901 (1991).
11. Stone, 347 N.C. at 481, 495 S.E.2d. at 716 (quoting Grogan v. Commonwealth, 577
S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky. 1979)).
12. 191 N.C. App. 575, 664 S.E.2d 58 (2008), discretionary review denied, 363 N.C. 129,
673 S.E.2d 360 (2009).
13. Id. at 576, 664 S.E.2d at 59.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 576-77, 664 S.E.2d at 59.
16. Id. at 577, 664 S.E.2d at 59-60.
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The defendants in Murray attempted to use the public duty
doctrine as a defense. 7 Previously, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that health departments may receive the protection of
the public duty doctrine. 8 In applying the doctrine in Murray,
however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals distinguished between
official capacity claims and individual capacity claims and held that
the doctrine applied only to the former.19 The court's holding led to
the contradictory result that the defendant simultaneously owed the
plaintiff a duty of care while acting in an individual capacity, but did
not owe the plaintiff a duty while acting in an official capacity.
Applying the public duty doctrine only to official capacity claims
is inconsistent with North Carolina precedent and ignores the
purpose of the doctrine by shifting liability to individuals who have
fewer resources than the State. Consequently, the holding in Murray
might discourage individuals from being state employees if courts can
hold these individuals liable while enforcing statutory regulations.
Without the protection of a consistently applied public duty doctrine,
the State may be less likely and less able to adopt additional
regulations. As a result, the public will not benefit from having many
safety risks minimized through state regulation.
Since the public duty doctrine benefits the public by encouraging
the General Assembly to pass regulations that make North Carolina
safer, the Supreme Court of North Carolina should overrule Murray
to clarify that the doctrine is applied based on the nature of the duty
owed regardless of whether the plaintiff files individual or official
capacity claims. By focusing on the duty owed, future courts can
apply the public duty doctrine uniformly to governmental entities and
their employees.
This Recent Development will begin by providing an overview of
the public duty doctrine in North Carolina. Next, it will discuss
problems with how the North Carolina Court of Appeals interpreted
the law surrounding the doctrine in Murray. Namely, the court of
appeals took an unwarranted departure from precedent by applying
the public duty doctrine differently to individual and official capacity
claims rather than applying the doctrine uniformly based on the duty
17. Id.
18. Watts v. N.C. Dept. of Env't & Natural Res., 182 N.C. App. 178, 182, 641 S.E.2d
811, 816 (2007), affd in part as modified per curiam by 362 N.C. 497, 666 S.E.2d 752
(2008).
19. Murray, 191 N.C. App. at 579, 664 S.E.2d at 61 ("We hold that the public duty
doctrine does not extend to government workers sued only in their individual
capacities.").
2010]
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owed by the defendants. Ultimately, this Recent Development will
argue that the court of appeals incorrectly decided Murray based on
the policies and case law supporting the public duty doctrine.
I. THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE IN NORTH CAROLINA
The public duty doctrine is a common law rule that limits the
State's liability for negligence. ° According to the doctrine, "when a
governmental entity owes a duty to the general public, particularly a
statutory duty, individual plaintiffs may not enforce the duty in
tort."21 The rule is founded on the premise that the State should not
have to expose itself to limitless tort liability when it decides how to
allocate limited resources for the public good.2
The public duty doctrine protects the State from tort liability by
restricting the scope of the State's duty to others. 23 To successfully
plead an action based on the tort of negligence, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant
breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries.24 The public duty doctrine precludes an
individual from suing a state employee for negligence in situations
where the employee owed a duty to the public rather than to the
individual.25 Because the state employee does not owe the individual
plaintiff a legal duty, the individual plaintiff cannot prove all the
elements of negligence and thus cannot successfully plead a case of
negligence.
Furthermore, the public duty doctrine precludes the State's
liability in tort independently from any waiver of sovereign immunity.
20. Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 465, 628 S.E.2d 761, 766 (2006) ("The public
duty doctrine is a separate rule of common law negligence that may limit tort liability,
even when the State has waived sovereign immunity.").
21. Id. at 465-66, 628 S.E.2d at 766 (citing Hunt ex reL Hasty v. N.C. Dep't of Labor,
348 N.C. 192, 499 S.E.2d 747 (1998); Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 495
S.E.2d 711, (1998); Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991)). The public
duty doctrine has been pejoratively described as " 'a duty to all, a duty to none.' "See, e.g.,
Swindell, supra note 5, at 248 (citing Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976);
Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979)).
22. Myers, 360 N.C. at 466, 628 S.E.2d at 766.
23. See id. at 465, 628 S.E.2d at 765-66 ("[W]e hold that each negligence claim ...
arises from the agency's performance of a statutorily defined public duty, which claim is
unenforceable by plaintiff or third-party plaintiffs individually ... ").
24. See Martishius v. Carolco Studios, Inc., 355 N.C. 465, 473, 562 S.E.2d 887, 892
(2002).
25. Myers, 360 N.C. at 465-66, 628 S.E.2d at 766.
[Vol. 88
PROTECTING THE GREATER GOOD
The Tort Claims Act 26 waives some of the State's sovereign immunity.
The Act imposes liability "under circumstances where the State ....
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the laws of North Carolina."'21 Some plaintiffs believed that the
doctrine did not apply to claims brought under the Tort Claims Act;
however, such arguments have not succeeded. 2 The Tort Claims Act
does not prevent the State from asserting the public duty doctrine
because that doctrine only protects the State from tort liability when
the State performs a public duty.29 Individuals do not have public
duties.3" Thus, without the doctrine, the State could be liable when an
individual could not be.31 That result would be inconsistent with the
Tort Claims Act, which imposes liability on the State in instances
where a private person would be liable.32 Therefore, under the Tort
Claims Act, the State, like an individual, can be liable only for its
negligent performance of private duties.3 3
Braswell v. Braswell4 created two exceptions to the public duty
doctrine: (1) existence of a special relationship and (2) reliance on
promised protection. First, the State can be liable if there is a special
relationship between the State and the injured party,36 such as the
relationship between a State's witness or informant and the police.37
A special relationship may also be statutorily created for a discrete
class of people.38 For example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (2007).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 478, 495 S.E.2d 711, 714
(1998) (holding that the Tort Claims Act allows the State to be liable only when a private
person would be).
29. See id.
30. See id. ("Private persons do not possess public duties.")
31. Id. at 479, 495 S.E.2d at 714.
32. Id. at 478, 495 S.E.2d at 714 ("[U]nder the Tort Claims Act, the State is liable if a
private person would be.").
33. Id. at 478-79, 495 S.E.2d at 714.
34. 330 N.C. 363,410 S.E.2d 897 (1991).
35. Id. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902. Other cases offer a different conception of the
exceptions. These cases conceptualize the only exception as the special duty exception,
with the special relationship exception as a subset of it. See, e.g., Cockerham-Ellerbee v.
Town of Jonesville, 176 N.C. App 372, 377, 626 S.E.2d 685, 689 (2006) (citing Vanasek v.
Duke Power Co., 132 N.C. App. 335, 338, 511 S.E.2d 41, 44 (1999)). The different
conception of the exceptions is not relevant to this Recent Development and will not
likely lead to different results.
36. Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371,410 S.E.2d at 902.
37. Id.
38. See Multiple Claimants v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 361 N.C. 372,
378, 646 S.E.2d 356, 360 (2007) (finding a special relationship between the Department of
2010] 699
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held that a special relationship existed between inmates in state
prisons and the North Carolina Department of Health and Human
Services ("DHHS") because a statute required that DHHS ensure the
inmates' well-being.39 By referencing "prisoners" and "inmates," the
statute created a duty to a specific group of people and not to the
public at large."n
Under the second exception to the public duty doctrine, the State
can be liable when an individual relies, to his detriment, on the State's
promised protection." This exception arises when a police officer
creates a special duty by promising to protect an individual, then fails
to protect that individual, and a causal relationship exists between the
individual's reliance on the officer's promise and the individual's
injury." Both exceptions are narrowly applied,43 but North Carolina
courts are particularly strict when applying the reliance on promised
protection exception, not applying it unless "the promise, reliance,
and causation are manifestly present."'
Despite the creation of these two exceptions, courts have
continued to expand the application of the public duty doctrine.
Initially, the public duty doctrine protected law enforcement officers
from suits brought against them by citizens for failing to prevent a
crime.n5 The doctrine now applies to state agencies that perform
inspections for the public's benefit.46 For example, courts have
applied the doctrine to claims brought against the North Carolina
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and its divisions
Health and Human Services and inmates because statutes required inspections of
confinement facilities to protect the health and welfare of the inmates).
39. Id. at 378-79, 646 S.E.2d at 360-61.
40. See id. at 378, 646 S.E.2d at 360.
41. See, e.g., Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902 (citing Coleman v. Cooper,
89 N.C. App. 188, 194, 366 S.E.2d 2, 6 (1988)).
42. Id.
43. Hunt ex rel. Hasty v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 197, 499 S.E.2d 747, 750
(1998) (citing Braswell, 330 N.C. at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902).
44. Watts v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 182 N.C. App. 178, 183, 641 S.E.2d
811, 816 (2007) (quoting Braswell, 330 N.C. at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902), affd in part as
modified per curiam by 362 N.C. 497, 666 S.E.2d 752 (2008); see also Isenhour v. Hutto,
350 N.C. 601, 606, 517 S.E.2d 121, 125 (1999) (establishing that the promise exception to
the special duty doctrine is a " 'very narrow one' " (quoting Braswell, 330 N.C. at 372, 410
S.E.2d at 902)).
45. Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901-02.
46. See Hunt, 348 N.C. at 197, 499 S.E.2d at 750 (holding the public duty doctrine
barred a claim based on a statute requiring the Department of Labor to inspect go-karts);
Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 481, 495 S.E.2d 711, 716 (1998) (finding the
purpose behind the doctrine, to protect state agencies with limited resources from the
burden of overwhelming liability, applied equally well to agencies that inspect as it does to
law enforcement).
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for negligent inspection of soil conditions47 and for failing to control a
forest fire.48 In contrast, at the local level, courts have limited the
public duty doctrine to law enforcement departments. 49 The
expansion outside of law enforcement has provided more
opportunities for courts to apply the exceptions to the doctrine," but
courts continue to adhere to strict applications of the doctrine.5
When deciding whether to apply the public duty doctrine to
statutory duties imposed on state agencies outside of the law
enforcement context, North Carolina courts have historically looked
at the nature of the duty owed and not the identity of the actor. 2
Courts have analyzed the language of the statute 53 and the practical
aspects of enforcement 54 when deciding if the statute created a duty to
the public or to individuals. If a court determined that a statute
requires a duty to the public, then the public duty doctrine applied to
bar claims based on negligent performance of the actions mandated
by the statute.55 However, if a court determined the statute created a
duty only to a discrete class of individuals, rather than the public at
47. Watts, 182 N.C. App. at 182, 641 S.E.2d at 816.
48. Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 462-63,628 S.E.2d 761, 763-64 (2006).
49. See Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 461, 526 S.E.2d 652, 654 (2000)
(refusing to expand the public duty doctrine at the local level outside of law enforcement
contexts); see also Ryan Rich, Recent Development, Seeing Through the Smoke and Fog:
Applying a Consistent Public Duty Doctrine in North Carolina after Myers v. McGrady, 85
N.C. L. REV. 706, 712-24 (2007) (describing the incongruous treatment of state and local
governments under the public duty doctrine by North Carolina courts). While the
inconsistent application of the public duty doctrine is problematic, such a discussion is
outside the scope of this piece.
50. See, e.g., Multiple Claimants v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 361 N.C.
372, 378, 646 S.E.2d 356, 360 (2007) (finding a special relationship between the
Department of Health and Human Services and inmates); Watts, 182 N.C. App. at 184, 641
S.E.2d at 817 (finding a special relationship between the NCDENR and the plaintiff).
51. See, e.g., Hunt, 348 N.C. at 198-99, 499 S.E.2d at 751 (refusing to apply either
exception to inspections of amusement park rides).
52. By looking at the nature of the duty, North Carolina courts have developed a
"functional," compared to an "identity," perspective. This has allowed the public duty
doctrine to apply more broadly at the state level. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 49, at 715-17
(describing the functional approach to the public duty doctrine in Myers). Courts have not
applied the functional approach to local government because the public duty doctrine is
limited to law enforcement at the local level. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying
text.
53. See Multiple Claimants, 361 N.C. at 377-78, 646 S.E.2d at 359-60; Myers, 360 N.C.
at 467-68, 628 S.E.2d at 767; Hunt, 348 N.C. at 197, 499 S.E.2d at 750; Stone v. N.C. Dep't
of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 482,495 S.E.2d 711, 716 (1998).
54. See Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 608, 517 S.E.2d 121, 126 (1999); Christmas v.
Cabarrus County, 192 N.C. App. 227,233-34, 664 S.E.2d 649, 653-54 (2008).
55. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
2010]
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large, the public duty doctrine did not apply, and the individual was
able to sue the State for negligently performing its statutory duty.56
The Supreme Court of North Carolina established this
framework for analyzing public duty doctrine claims in Stone v. North
Carolina Department of Labor.57 In Stone, the court relied on
statutory language requiring inspections " 'as often as practicable' "
to find the statute created a duty to the public and not to individuals.5 8
The court also found it persuasive that the statute did not authorize a
private right of action to ensure compliance with the statute.59 The
court's use of this framework in later decisions demonstrates its
approval.60
Despite its expansion outside of the law enforcement arena and
its bar on claims brought under the Tort Claims Act, the public duty
doctrine is not an impenetrable shield that precludes the government
from liability for negligence. Courts are less likely to apply the public
duty doctrine when statutes require the protection of a discrete class
of people from limited dangers and in limited areas.61 The exceptions
also provide an avenue for individuals to hold the State liable.62
Furthermore, no North Carolina court has used the public duty
doctrine to shield a defendant from actions directly causing death or
injury. The public duty doctrine has shielded defendants only where
their actions proximately or indirectly caused injury or death.63 Thus,
56. See Multiple Claimants, 361 N.C. at 377-78, 646 S.E.2d at 359-60 (finding a statute
requiring the inspection of prisons created a special relationship between the State and the
inmates).
57. 347 N.C. 473, 495 S.E.2d 711 (1998).
58. Id. at 482, 495 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-4(5) (1996)).
59. Id.
60. See Hunt ex rel. Hasty v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 197, 499 S.E.2d 747,
750 (1998) (finding that the language of a statute requiring inspections of amusement park
rides did not create a duty to individuals).
61. See Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 608, 517 S.E.2d 121, 126 (1999) (declining to
apply the public duty doctrine because school crossing guards owe a duty to protect
"certain children, at certain times, in certain places," not the general public); Christmas v.
Cabarrus County, 192 N.C. App. 227, 233-34, 664 S.E.2d 649, 653-54 (2008) (refusing to
apply the public duty doctrine because the county had to inspect homes of children only
after reports of neglect, which created a limited class).
62. See Multiple Claimants v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 361 N.C. 372,
377-78, 646 S.E.2d 356, 359-60 (2007) (relying on the limited class of inmates and the
inmates' confinement to find a special relationship existed); Davis v. Messer, 119 N.C.
App. 44, 60, 457 S.E.2d 902, 912 (1995) (finding a special duty existed between the fire
department and an individual who called 911 seeking the fire department's assistance).
63. See Moses v. Young, 149 N.C. App. 613, 616-17, 561 S.E.2d 332, 334-35 (2002)
(citing an extensive list of North Carolina cases that have only applied the doctrine when
defendants' actions caused the injury).
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critics' fears that the public duty doctrine will shield the State from all
liability for its actions6' are unfounded.
II. THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE IN MURRAY V. COUNTY OF
PERSON
The dispute in Murray v. County of Person65 arose because the
plaintiff, Joy Murray, needed an improvement permit from the
PCHD in order to install a wastewater treatment system on her
property.66  In November 2002, defendant Adam Sarver, an
Environmental Health Specialist for the PCHD, inspected Murray's
property and issued a permit approving installation of the wastewater
treatment system. 67 Shortly after Murray moved into her home in
March 2003, "[she] noticed water surfacing on her property."' After
learning that the water was related to a problem with her wastewater
treatment system, Murray contacted Sarver, who then conducted a
series of inspections.69 Sarver, along with two other members of the
PCHD, approved the installation of a new line and a new wastewater
treatment system to solve Murray's problem.7" After this new system
failed in early 2004, Murray sued the PCHD and Sarver and two
other members of the PCHD in their individual and official
capacities.7' "She alleged negligence ... in the issuance of permits for
the installation and repair of her wastewater treatment system."72
On the facts, the case appeared to be a perfect candidate for the
public duty doctrine. The public duty doctrine protects the Health
Department and its employees when they are conducting statutorily
mandated inspections of sites before the installation of a wastewater
64. See Stone, 347 N.C. at 484, 495 S.E.2d at 717 (Orr, J., dissenting) (allowing the
public duty doctrine to bar claims filed under the Tort Claims Act "nullifie[s]" individuals'
ability to sue the State); Swindell, supra note 5, at 279 (stating that municipalities will hide
behind the governmental immunity provided by the public duty doctrine after negligently
inspecting homes).
65. 191 N.C. App. 575, 664 S.E.2d 58 (2008), discretionary review denied, 363 N.C. 129,
673 S.E.2d 360 (2009).
66. Id. at 576, 664 S.E.2d at 59.
67. Id. Sarver was present at Murray's house to fulfill a statutory duty. See id. at 578,
664 S.E.2d at 60. Environmental Health Specialists, who conduct inspections to determine
whether a lot is suitable for a wastewater treatment system, may use the public duty
doctrine. See id.
68. Id. at 576, 664 S.E.2d at 59.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 576-77, 664 S.E.2d at 59.
72. Id. at 577, 664 S.E.2d at 59.
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treatment system.73 Sarver and the two other members of the PCHD
(the "defendants") went to Murray's house for the purpose of
conducting an inspection to determine whether the site was suitable
for a wastewater treatment system as required by statute.74 Thus, the
defendants should have been able to use the public duty doctrine as a
defense.
The Murray court, however, did not follow public duty doctrine
precedent and instead applied the doctrine based on the nature of the
claims against the defendants.75 Murray filed both individual and
official capacity claims against the defendants.76 The court found that
the public duty doctrine barred the official capacity claims,77 but the
court refused to apply the doctrine to the individual claims because
no case has held that "an employee of a health department is entitled
to the protection of the public duty doctrine when sued only in his or
her individual capacity .... "78 The court rejected the defendants'
arguments that they could rely on public officers' immunity79 and
found the defendants individually liable.8"
The result in Murray is confusing: the defendants did not owe
Murray a duty in their official capacities, but the defendants did owe
Murray a duty simultaneously in their individual capacities, which is
inconsistent with negligence principles. The Murray court ignored
public duty doctrine precedent because no other case has applied the
doctrine based on the nature of the claims filed.
The fact that a plaintiff filed individual and official capacity
claims has not previously been relevant to the application of the
73. Id. at 578, 664 S.E.2d at 60 (citing Watts v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res.,
182 N.C. App. 178, 182, 641 S.E.2d 811, 816 (2007), affd in part as modified per curiam by
362 N.C. 497, 666 S.E.2d 752 (2008)).
74. See id. at 576, 664 S.E.2d at 59.
75. See id. at 578-79, 664 S.E.2d at 61. Murray sued Person County and the PCHD;
Sarver; Harold Kelly, another Environmental Health Specialist; and Janet Clayton, an
Environmental Health Supervisor. Id. at 576-77, 664 S.E.2d at 59. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Person County and PCHD. Id. at 577, 664 S.E.2d at 59. The
trial court further granted summary judgment in favor of Sarver, Kelly, and Clayton (the
"defendants") in relation to official capacity claims made by the plaintiff. Id. The
defendants appealed this partial summary judgment, claiming that both the public duty
doctrine and public officers' immunity would shield them from liability for individual
capacity claims too. Id. at 577, 664 S.E.2d at 60.
76. See id. at 576-77, 664 S.E.2d at 59.
77. Id. at 578, 664 S.E.2d at 60-61.
78. Id. at 578, 664 S.E.2d at 61.
79. Id. at 579, 664 S.E.2d at 61.
80. Id. at 581, 664 S.E.2d at 62.
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public duty doctrine.81 When the Supreme Court of North Carolina
adopted the public duty doctrine, the court did not differentiate
between individual or official capacity claims.82 A distinction between
individual and official capacity claims was not discussed in Braswell-
the plaintiff simply sued Ralph L. Tyson, Sheriff of Pitt County.83 Yet,
it is unlikely the Supreme Court of North Carolina would have
ignored the distinction if it had been relevant to the case. Previous
cases looked to the nature of the duty owed, not the actor involved or
claims filed, when determining whether the public duty doctrine
applied to state entities.8' In those rare cases where plaintiffs filed
both individual and official capacity claims, the nature of the claims
was not part of the courts' public duty doctrine analysis." Each of
these cases had extraneous facts that rendered the public duty
doctrine inapplicable to bar the claims. These extraneous facts, and
not the fact that the plaintiff filed individual capacity claims,
persuaded each court not to apply the public duty doctrine in the
following cases.
The plaintiffs in Lynn v. Overlook Development86 sued a building
inspector for the City of Asheville in both his individual and official
capacities for negligently issuing a permit, which stated that plaintiffs'
home complied with housing regulations.87 The court dismissed the
official capacity claims under the public duty doctrine. 88  The
individual claims were not dismissed,89 however, because they were
based on actions outside the scope of defendant's employment.90 The
public duty doctrine does not preclude claims based on individual
81. See, e.g., Wood v. Guilford County, 355 N.C. 161, 163, 558 S.E.2d 490, 492-93
(2002); Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 459, 526 S.E.2d 652, 653 (2000); Hunt v.
N.C. Dep't of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 194, 499 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1998); Stone v. N.C. Dep't of
Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 476, 495 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1998); Sinning v. Clark, 119 N.C. App. 515,
517-18, 459 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Thompson v. Waters, 351
N.C. 462, 465,526 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2000).
82. See Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 371-72, 410 S.E.2d 897, 901-02 (1991).
83. See id. at 366, 410 S.E.2d at 899.
84. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
86. 328 N.C. 689, 403 S.E.2d 469 (1991).
87. Id. at 691, 403 S.E.2d at 470.
88. Lynn v. Overlook Dev., 98 N.C. App. 75, 78, 389 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1990), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 328 N.C. 689, 403 S.E.2d 469 (1991).
89. Id. at 80, 389 S.E.2d at 613.
90. Lynn, 328 N.C. at 692, 403 S.E.2d at 470. The individual capacity claims were
based on "willful, wanton, unlawful, culpable, and/or reckless conduct outside the scope of
[defendant's] duties as a city employee." Id. These claims were ultimately dismissed
because the plaintiffs failed to prove defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of their
injuries. See id. at 697, 403 S.E.2d at 473-74.
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willful or reckless conduct; everyone as an individual owes others a
duty to refrain from acting unlawfully or recklessly.9 The Lynn
decision, therefore, merely reinforces the fact that the public duty
doctrine bars claims when a duty is owed to the public but not when a
duty is owed to an individual.92
Other cases rely on the fact that the relationship between a
plaintiff and government employee renders the doctrine inapplicable
and not the fact that a plaintiff brought individual and official
capacity claims when holding a government employee personally
liable. In Isenhour v. Hutto,93 the nature of the relationship between
an adult school crossing guard and the children she guarded
convinced the court that the public duty doctrine was inappropriate. 4
The court found that the public duty doctrine did not apply to
crossing guards because, unlike police officers who must protect the
general public from unknown dangers, the "relationship between a
crossing guard and a child is direct and personal, and the dangers are
immediate and foreseeable."95 After finding that Robbie Faye
Morrison, the crossing guard and a defendant in the case,96 had a duty
to protect the individual children, the court analyzed whether
Morrison could be held individually liable.97 The discussion of
individual liability was appropriate only after the court found the
public duty doctrine inapplicable because Morrison owed an
individual child an individual duty, and thus, the doctrine did not
shield Morrison from liability.98 Basic negligence law requires there to
be a duty before an individual can be held liable.99 Isenhour
demonstrates that a court must first analyze whether the public duty
doctrine is applicable. If the court finds that the public duty doctrine
does not apply and the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, then the
court can determine whether the defendant is individually liable.
91. See JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & M. STUART MADDEN,
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 112 (1996) ("The duty concept has been expanding to the point
that now one engaged in risk-creating conduct generally owes a duty to avoid causing
foreseeable personal injuries to foreseeable plaintiffs.").
92. See Lynn, 328 N.C. at 697,403 S.E.2d at 473-74.
93. 350 N.C. 601, 517 S.E.2d 121 (1999).
94. Id. at 608, 517 S.E.2d at 126.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 602, 517 S.E.2d at 123.
97. Id. at 608-09, 517 S.E.2d at 126-27.
98. Id. at 608, 517 S.E.2d at 126.
99. E.g., Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 482, 495 S.E.2d 711, 716 (1998)
("Absent a duty, there can be no liability." (citing Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 240, 96
S.E.2d 14, 17 (1957))).
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Lastly, in Davis v. Messer,100 the fact that the Chief of the
Waynesville Fire Department, Messer, was sued in his individual and
official capacities was not relevant to whether the public duty
doctrine barred claims filed for negligently responding to a 911 call.10'
The court held that the special duty exception existed, and thus, the
public duty doctrine did not apply.0 2 Because the exception existed,
the defendant fire chief owed the plaintiff a duty as an individual.13
Consequently, Messer could be sued in an individual capacity. Again,
the factual circumstances allowed the individual capacity claims.
Messer owed Davis a duty as an individual because the special duty
exception applied."° Thus, Messer could be sued in his individual
capacity. Once again, it is the facts that allowed the individual
capacity claims, not that the plaintiff filed individual capacity claims.
Murray differs from the cases discussed above in which courts
held state employees liable as individuals. All of these cases
demonstrate that the nature of the claims filed is irrelevant to the
public duty doctrine analysis. As these cases show, there must be an
alternative basis to justify holding the plaintiff liable as an individual.
Reckless conduct outside the scope of the public duty the employee
performed,105 reasons making the public duty inapplicable,0 6 or an
exception to the public duty doctrine07 are all alternative bases
barring a court from applying the public duty doctrine. As these cases
demonstrate, there must be facts that justify the inapplicability of the
public duty doctrine. These cases do not support the result in Murray
because Murray had no extraneous facts that rendered the public
duty doctrine inapplicable. The plaintiff did not allege Sarver
committed reckless action outside the scope of his employment that
would implicate an individual duty owed by Sarver. 108 Unlike
Isenhour, where the public duty doctrine did not apply at all, the
100. 119 N.C. App. 44, 457 S.E.2d 902 (1995).
101. See id. at 48, 51-52, 60, 457 S.E.2d at 905, 907, 912.
102. See id. at 60, 457 S.E.2d at 912.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Lynn v. Overlook Dev., 328 N.C. 689, 691-92, 403 S.E.2d 469, 470 (1991).
106. Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 608, 517 S.E.2d 121, 126 (1999) (finding the
public duty doctrine inapplicable because school crossing guards do not owe a general
duty to protect the public, but rather a specific duty relating to specific individuals at
specific times).
107. See Davis, 119 N.C. App. at 60, 457 S.E.2d at 912 (finding the special relationship
exception applied).
108. See Lynn, 328 N.C. at 691-92, 403 S.E.2d at 470 (reporting that all claims against
the defendants were dismissed except those alleging "willful, wanton, unlawful, culpable,
and/or reckless conduct" that was beyond the scope of the defendants' duties).
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Murray court held that the public duty doctrine applied to the
relationship between an environmental specialist and a homeowner.10 9
Unlike Davis, the Murray court did not find a basis for applying the
special duty exception."' The Murray court erred in allowing the
defendant to be individually liable for performing statutory duties
owed to the public simply because the plaintiff filed individual
capacity claims. Therefore, Murray, without extraneous facts, is
distinguishable from relevant, prior case law and sharply deviates
from North Carolina precedent.
Due to its improper focus on the nature of the claims, the
Murray court believed the defendants had to rely on public officers'
immunity rather than the public duty doctrine because the plaintiffs
sued them in their individual capacities."' The court relied on several
cases, including Isenhour, to support its proposition that North
Carolina courts generally apply public officers' immunity rather than
the public duty doctrine when government employees are sued in
their individual capacity."12
The court, however, misinterpreted Isenhour as well as the other
cases. In Isenhour, the court followed the analysis outlined in
Stone"'-the Isenhour court analyzed what performance the duty
entailed and then found the public duty doctrine inapplicable because
the defendant owed a duty to individuals rather than to the public.1'14
The Isenhour court did not analyze whether public officers' immunity
applied until after it determined that the public duty doctrine was
inapplicable."5 Had the Isenhour court found that the defendant
owed a duty to the public, then it would have been unnecessary to
109. Murray v. County of Person, 191 N.C. App. 575, 578, 664 S.E.2d 58, 60 (2008),
discretionary review denied, 363 N.C. 129, 673 S.E.2d 360 (2009).
110. See id. at 578-79, 664 S.E.2d at 60-61.
111. Id. at 579, 664 S.E.2d at 61 ("Where a governmental worker is sued in his
individual capacity, rather than applying the public duty doctrine, our courts have
consistently applied public officers' immunity." (citing Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601,
609, 517 S.E.2d 121, 127 (1999); Epps v. Duke Univ., Inc., 122 N.C. App. 198, 205, 468
S.E.2d 846, 851-52 (1996); EEE-ZZZ Lay Drain Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 108
N.C. App. 24, 28, 422 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Meyer v.
Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 107, 489 S.E.2d 880, 886 (1997))).
112. Id. (citing Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 609, 517 S.E.2d 121, 127 (1999); Epps
v. Duke Univ., Inc., 122 N.C. App. 198, 205,468 S.E.2d 846, 851-52 (1996); EEE-ZZZ Lay
Drain Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 108 N.C. App. 24, 28, 422 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1992),
overruled on other grounds by Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 107, 489 S.E.2d 880, 886
(1997)).
113. Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 607-08, 517 S.E.2d 121, 126 (1999). For a
discussion of the Stone framework, see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
114. Isenhour at 608, 517 S.E.2d at 126.
115. Id. at 609-612, 517 S.E.2d at 127-28.
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conduct a public officers' immunity analysis because the public duty
doctrine would have barred the claims. Thus, Isenhour shows that a
court must first find that a defendant owes a plaintiff an individual
duty before conducting a public officers' immunity analysis. The other
cases relied on by the Murray court did not involve the public duty
doctrine and are consequently irrelevant." 6 The most these cases
prove is that the Murray court skipped an analytical step by
conducting a public officers' immunity analysis without finding that
defendants owed Murray an individual duty.
By ignoring the Stone framework, the Murray court reached a
conclusion that is inconsistent with tort law. The Stone framework is
consistent with tort law because it imposes liability on the State only
when the State owes a duty to individuals. 7 It is a basic tort principle
that without a duty, there can be no liability for negligence." 8 Sarver
was present on Murray's property solely to perform a duty he owed to
the public."9 A person acting as a private individual does not have
public duties.' Thus, Sarver, as an individual, cannot owe a duty to
Murray if he was performing a public duty.12' The court effectively
held Sarver liable as an individual for a duty he did not possess, which
disregards precedent and frustrates public policy.'22
III. BROADER POLICY THREATENED BY THE MURRAY DECISION
The Murray decision threatens the policy behind the public duty
doctrine. The public duty doctrine was created to protect the State's
116. See Murray, 191 N.C. App. at 579, 664 S.E.2d at 61; see also Epps v. Duke Univ.,
Inc., 122 N.C. App. 198, 200-05, 468 S.E.2d 846, 849-52 (1996) (evaluating a claim under
public officers' immunity but failing to consider the public duty doctrine as a possible
defense); EEE-ZZZ Lay Drain Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 108 N.C. App. 24, 28-
30, 422 S.E.2d 338, 341-42 (1992) (focusing on public officers' immunity but failing to
consider the public duty doctrine as a possible defense), overruled on other grounds by
Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 107, 489 S.E.2d 880, 886 (1997).
117. See Rich, supra note 49, at 724 n.123.
118. See Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473,482,495 S.E.2d 711,716 (1998).
119. See Murray, 191 N.C. App. at 576, 664 S.E.2d at 59 (reporting that Sarver was on
Murray's property only to install and repair Murray's wastewater system).
120. See Stone, 347 N.C. at 478,495 S.E.2d at 714.
121. Sarver, or any state employee, could be liable for negligent, reckless, or wanton
conduct outside of the scope of his employment. See Lynn v. Overlook Dev., 328 N.C. 689,
691-92, 403 S.E.2d 469, 470 (1991) (involving claims based on the defendant employee's
reckless conduct that occurred beyond the scope of the defendant's employment). Since
Murray did not present evidence that Sarver committed negligent, reckless, or wanton
conduct outside of the scope of his employment, it is unlikely that he could be held liable
under this theory.
122. See Stone, 347 N.C. at 482, 495 S.E.2d at 716 (citing Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C.
236, 240, 96 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1957)).
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limited resources."2' The Murray decision, however, is inconsistent
with this policy because it transfers liability from the State to
individual employees, who have even less resources than the State. 124
Since the doctrine is designed to preserve limited resources, the
employees should be protected before the State since they have fewer
resources.
Because the reasoning in Murray effectively creates a third
exception to the public duty doctrine for individual capacity claims,
state employees will likely face limited liability frequently. Following
Murray, plaintiffs can avoid the public duty doctrine simply by suing
individuals in their individual capacities. As the Murray decision
shows, state employees will not be able to rely on public officers'
immunity to shield them from liability. 25 Thus, the individual capacity
claim exception created by Murray would eviscerate the protections
provided by the public duty doctrine.
By weakening the effectiveness of the public duty doctrine, the
Murray decision threatens the ability of the State to allocate
resources with discretion. The protection provided by the public duty
doctrine provides the General Assembly with the ability to adopt
regulations freely, and the public benefits from having a legislature
that can freely enact new regulations for the public's well-being. 26
Since the General Assembly knows it is protected from liability, it
does not have to balance the benefit of regulations against the
possible costs of liability from carrying out those regulations
negligently. While under Murray the State will still be protected from
liability, the legislature will have to consider the effect employee
liability will have on its ability to enforce regulations. The State will
likely have difficulty finding employees to enforce the regulations and
carry out statutory inspections once the employees learn they alone
can be held liable for performing their public duties.127 The State
123. Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 466, 628 S.E.2d 761, 766 (2006).
124. As a matter of responsible government, the author of this Recent Development
does not think the State would want to send the message that individuals can be held liable
for decisions the State makes, but that the State cannot. Individual employees charged
with enforcing those regulations had no input in deciding to adopt the regulations. It is
disingenuous for the State to use employees as an insurance policy.
125. Murray v. County of Person, 191 N.C. App. 575, 579-81, 664 S.E.2d 58, 61-62
(2008) (finding that Environmental Health Specialists are public employees and not
eligible for public officers' immunity because their duties are ministerial), discretionary
review denied, 363 N.C. 129, 673 S.E.2d 360 (2009).
126. See Brown-Graham, supra note 5, at 2325.
127. See NORTH CAROLINA STATE FIREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, A REPORT
PRESENTING THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PARTICIPANTS
OF THE GATEWAY CONFERENCE 5 (2000), available at http://www.ncsfa.com/pdf/
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cannot enact regulations if no one is willing to be the employee whose
duty it is to enforce the regulations. Therefore, by weakening the
protections of the public duty doctrine and by limiting the State's
freedom to regulate, the decision in Murray harms the public.
IV. CONCLUSION
The public duty doctrine has engendered much criticism.'28
Despite its critics, a majority of states continue to use the public duty
doctrine, evidencing its usefulness.129 The criticisms ignore the public
purpose of the public duty doctrine, which is to protect the public
good by allowing governments to provide important services without
exposing themselves to the potential for crippling civil liability based
on the performance of those services.3 ' Since it was designed to
protect the public welfare, the doctrine should be analyzed at a public
rather than individual level. The criticisms are normally based on
individual "injustices" and, therefore, ignore the greater good
achieved by the doctrine.
gateway_2000.pdf (noting a need to ensure that members are covered by the public duty
doctrine); Memorandum from EMS Director J.M Tezai distributed to Durham County
EMS, Fire, and 9-1-1 personnel, available at http://www.ncaemsa.org/public.duty
_doctrine.htm (worrying that its members are no longer covered by the public duty
doctrine). Other industries monitor the scope of the public duty doctrine as well. See
Howrey LLP, North Carolina Supreme Court Allows Homeowners to Sue for Negligent
Building Inspection, CONSTRUCrION WEBLINKS, Sept. 24, 2001, httpi/www
.constructionweblhnks.com/ResourcesIndustryReports Newsletters/SepL24_2001/northcaroli
nasupremescourt.htm (monitoring developments in how the doctrine affects the
construction industry).
128. See Stone v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 486-87, 495 S.E.2d 711, 718-19
(1998) (Orr, J., dissenting); Swindell, supra note 5, at 250-51.
129. Only Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oregon,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have abrogated or limited the public duty doctrine. See Adams
v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976), superseded by statute, Act effective May 18,
1977, ch. 37, §§ 1-3, 1977 Alaska Sess. Laws (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.65.070 (2008)), as recognized in Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 669 P.2d 569,
571 (Alaska 1983); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc), superseded by
statute, Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 285, § 3, 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1091, 1092-93 (codified as
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-820.01 to .09 (2003)), as recognized in Bird v.
State, 821 P.2d 287, 288-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158-60
(Colo. 1986) (en banc); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d
1010, 1015-16 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 673-74 (Iowa 1979);
Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351, 1358 (La. 1980); Schear v. Bd. of County Comm'rs
of Bernalillo, 687 P.2d 728, 731 (N.M. 1984); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 724
(Or. 1979) (in banc); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Wis. 1976);
DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986); see Swindell, supra note 5, at 249 n.53.
130. See Brown-Graham, supra note 5, at 2294-96 (describing the origin of the public
duty doctrine).
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The Murray court possibly felt pressured to achieve "justice" at
the individual level when it held that a state health inspector could be
held individually liable while carrying out a statutory duty to the
public. To achieve individual justice, the Murray court applied the
public duty doctrine in an unprecedented manner. When one
considers the ramifications of this decision, one realizes that the risks
this decision creates for the public may outweigh the benefits of the
individual justice achieved. The Murray decision limits the
effectiveness of the public duty doctrine. Previously, the doctrine
barred all claims brought against the State and its employees for
negligently performing duties owed to the public. In Murray, the
court used the doctrine to bar claims against the Health Department
and Sarver as an official. However, the doctrine did not bar individual
capacity claims. The threat of employee liability hinders the State's
ability to regulate. If the State is not as willing to regulate, threats to
the public will increase. The decision in Murray placed the short-term
individual benefit over the long-term public benefit. Allowing
individuals to recover does not outweigh the benefit the public
derives from the accidents state regulations prevent. Although the
Supreme Court of North Carolina denied review of the case,"'
Murray remains bad precedent because it hampers the General
Assembly's ability to regulate freely and protect the public at large.
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